THB AUGUST-SYLLABUS.

We have attempted to state the main considerations
upon which the Supreme Court will base its decision,
whenever and on whichever side the decision is reached.
In such a region of mingled law and politics it seems impossible to do more.
New York, February2, 1892.
NOTE.
Since the preceding article was put in type, the Supreme Court has
handed down a decision affirming the validity of the McKinley Act in
this respect among others. The opinions are not yet at hand. Chief
Justice FULLER and Mr. Justice LAMAR appear to take the view maintained here, while the rest of the Court, speaking by Mr. Justice HARLAN,
consider that the President is not vested by the act with any real legislative power, but is left to ascertain that a particular fact exists. Until
the opinion of the Court is handed down in full, it will be difficult to say
in what cases legislative discretion may hereafter be held to bd delegated.

-E.B. W.
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A German vessel, loading at Singapore for London, took on board,
with other cargo, a quantity of pepper shipped by British subjects, under English bills of lading in the usual form. On the voyage, heavy
weather was experienced, and the vessel put into a port of distress, both
the ship and portion of the cargo being damaged. The master telegraphed to this effect to the ship's agent at Singapore, and the contents
of the telegram were communicated to the various shippers, but no instructions were received by the master. Thereupon the master, acting
in good faith on the best advice he could obtain, and believing it to be
for the benefit of the cargo-owners, sold, with other cargo, a considerable
portion of the pepper, much of which might have been reshipped, and
some of which was, in fact, sent on by the purchasers in other vessels to
London, where it fetched substantially the price of sound pepper.
In an action for breach of contract and conversion, brought by the
plaintiffs, who were the consignees of the whole, and the purchasers of
part of the pepper so sold by the master:
Held, that the defendants, the owners of the vessel, were not liable,
as the law of the flag must be looked at to determine the propriety of
the sale, and by German law the conduct of the master was justifiable.

Action for non-delivery of goods.
The facts are as stated in the syllabus.
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SIR JAMES HANNEN, President, after stating the nature of the action, proceeded: This action is brought in
respect of the pepper sold at Cape Town as damaged, it
being contended further for the plaintiffs that such sale was

not necessary or justifiable.

The defendants pleaded that the August was "a German vessel, and entitled to fly the German flag, and to allthe privileges of a German ship; and that the defendants
and charterers of the said ship were German subjects, resident in Germany; and that the master was a German subject; and that the charter party was a German contract;
and that the contracts contained in the bills of lading for
the carriage of the said pepper were made and entered into
subject to German law; and that by the German law . . .
the sale of the said goods was lawful and right."
The question raised by this plea was first argued
before me, it being agreed that the other questions arising
in the case should stand over until I had -determined
whether the propriety or impropriety of the conduct of the
captain in selling the pepper alleged to be damaged was to
be determined by English or German law.
The broad distinction suggested to exist between the
English and German law on the subject under consideration is, that by the English law it is not sufficient to justify
the sale of the goods at a port of refuge, that the captain
acted in good faith and in the exercise of the best judgment
he could form, if it should be held by the tribunal before
which the question may come that there was not in fact a
real necessity for the sale; whereas, by the German law,
the sale will be justified if the captain, after taking the best
advice he can obtain, honestly comes to the conclusion that
a sale is best for the interests of the persons for whom he is
called upon to act in the emergency which has arisen.
This is not given as a complete statement of the German law on the subject, but merely as an indication of the
nature of its difference from the English law for the purposes of the present inquiry.
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The argument for the defendants is based on the principle laid down by the Court of Exchequer Chamber in
Lloyd v. Guibert,' that where the contract of affreightment does not provide otherwise, as between the parties to
the contract in respect of sea damages and its incidents, the
law of the country to which the ship belongs must be taken
to be the law to which they have submitted themselves.
In the very learned judgment in that case, delivered
by WILLES, J., on behalf of the Exchequer Chamber, he
says p. 129): "Exceptional cases, should they arise, must
be dealt with upon their merits. In laying down a rule of
law, regard ought rather to be had to the majority of cases
upon which doubt and litigation are more likely to arise;
and the general rule, that where the contract of affreightment does not provide otherwise, there, as between the
parties to such contract, in respect to sea damage and its
incidents, the law of the ship should govern, seems to be
not only in accordance with the probable intention of the
parties, but also most consistent and intelligible, and, therefore, most convenient to those engaged in commerce."
This subject has since been very fully considered by
the Court of Appeal in the case of the Gaetano and Maria.'
In that case goods were shipped by British subjects under
a charter party made in London for the carriage of goods
to England in an Italian ship. The ship put into Fayal
in distress, and the master entered into a bottomry bond,
by which he hypothecated the cargo as well as the ship
without communicating, as he might have done, with the
cargo-owners, but which, by the Italian law, he was not
bound to do. The question was whether the captain was
bound by the English law, by which he had no authority
to bind the owners of the cargo without communicating
with them; or by the Italian law, under which such communication was unnecessary.
The present Master of the Rolls, in giving judgment
in that case, says (p. 146): "What is the principle which
ought to govern the case? The goods are put on board an
Italian ship, and the person to exercise arthority is an ItalI Law
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ian master. Is the authority of the Italian master to depend upon the law of the country of the shipper, when the
law is contrary to the law of his own country? Why should
it? Is the master of the ship to be taken to know the law
of the country of each shipper of the goods which are put
on board his ship? It would be strange if that were so.
If a merchant puts his goods into the power of an Italian
master on board an Italian owner's ship, what is. the meaning of the transaction but that he is to deal with goods on
board his ship, unless he is bound to another mode? Upon
principle, it seems to me that he who ships goods on board
a foreign ship, ships them to be dealt with by the master of
that ship according to the law of the country of that ship,
unless there is a stipulation to the contrary."
And after reviewing the facts of the case of Lloyd v.
Guibert,' and pointing out that there the contract was one
of affreightment, he continues : " Still, if the contract was
there held to be a foreign contract, because it was made
with regard to the shipment of goods on board a foreign
ship, the principle governs this case, and would authorize
our saying that the authority which arises out of the contract of shipment is the authority which the law of the
country of the ship would give to the master."
And COTTON, L. J., thus states the principle applicable (p. 149): "When the owner of goods puts them on
board a vessel, he must authorize the owner of that vessel,
and his agent, the captain, to deal with those goods according to the law of the country to which that vessel belongs."
This "rule is applicable, because no one who ships goods
-on board a vessel can be ignorant of the flag-that is, of the
country to which the ship belongs-whilst the master would
be in a very difficult position if he had to inquire what was
the law of the country of the goods if, as regards one portion of the cargo, he had power to deal, when the necessity
arose, in one way, and as regards another portion of the
cargo in another way."
This appears to me to be binding authority in the
1Law
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present case, unless a valid distinction can be drawn between the law which is to govern the right of a master to
hypothecate cargo and that applicable to his right to sell it
in circumstances of emergency. I can find no such distinction, and it will have been seen that the passages I
have quoted from the judgments in Lloyd v. Guibert' and
the Gaetano and Maria are perfectly general, and apply
with equal force to the case of a master called upon in a
position of difficulty to deiermine whether he should sell
goods as to that of one having to determine whether he
should pledge them.
It was urged also for the plaintiffs that a later case in
the Court of Appeal, the Chartered Mercantile Bank of
India v. Netherlands, India, etc., Co., ' modified the decision in the Gaetano and Maria and supported their contention. I am of opinion, however, that it has no such
effect. There is no such suggestion throughout the
judgments there delivered that there was any intention to
vary the law as laid down in the earlier cases I have
cited. There, goods were shipped under a bill of lading
containing, amongst other excepted risks, "collision."
In the course of the voyage the carrying ship came into
collision with another vessel belonging to the same
owners, both ships being to blame. It was a question in
dispute whether both were Dutch. It was held that,
whether they were Dutch or not, the defendants were
liable in tort for the negligence of their servants on
board the ship with which the carrying vessel collided.
This case does not appear to me to throw any light on
the one now under consideration. It was held in that
case that the contract was English, even though the ship
in which the goods were carried was Dutch. Assuming
that the contract in the present case was English, that
does not govern the question of what law is to be applied
to goods carried in a German ship, a state of facts not
provided for and not contemplated by the contract having arisen. Such facts existing, we must consider what
1Law
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law it is just to apply to these exceptional circumstances,
and, for the reasons so forcibly stated in Lloyd v. Guibert
and in the Gaetano and Maria, it appears to me that
the master of the August could only be expected to act
in conformity with the law of his flag.
Holding, fierefore, as I do, that the captain, in dealing with the damaged cargo at the port of distress, was
entitled to act in accordance with German law, I proceed to consider what is the German law applicable to
such a case.
(After reviewing the German law at length, the
learnedjudge held that it absolved the master and owners of the shi from liability for the sale, and judgment
was directedfor the defendants.)
THiE LAW OF THE FLAG.
The foregoing case is the latest
* application of that canon of construction, commonly designated as
the "law of the flag," which has
been adopted by the English courts
in cases involving the relations
arising from a contract by charter
party or bill of lading, where, either
owing to the diverse nationality of
the parties, or other circumstances
connected' with the transaction,
there is no conclusive presumption
as to the municipal law to which
recourse must be had to determine
the rights of the parties.
Mr. FoorE, in his work on Private
International Law, page 408, states
that the law of the flag is "to regulate the liabilities and regulations
which arise among the parties to
the agreement, be it of affreightment or by hypothecation, upon
this principle; that the ship-owner
who sends his vessel into a foreign
port gives a notice by his flag, to
all who enter into contracts with
the shipmaster, that he intends the

law of that flag to regulate those
contracts, and that they must either
submit to its operation or not contract with him or his agent at all."
While the rule, thus broadly
stated, has never been judicially
recognized in this country, but, on
the contrary, has been repudiated
when it has come before the courts
for consideration, there can be no
doubt but that, when a case shall
arise which shall call for its application within its proper limits,
the courts of this country will follow it.
The Nature 'of the Rule.-Until within a comparatively recent time the prevailing doctrine
was that the recognition and enforcement of a foreign municipal
law were based upon. the comity
prevailing among nations, and even
at the present time that theory
is not without its adherents. (See
remarks of Judge BROWN, in the
Brantford City, 29 1ged. Rep., 373.
to 383.)
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The current theory, however, is
that the force of a foreign municipal
law is in no wise due to a spirit of
comity, but depends upon the intention of the parties, which, when
ascertained, must be enforced as a
matter of right. Considered as a
foreign law, it can have no extra
territorial effect, and none can be
conferred by comity; but, viewed
as a stipulation, which the parties
to a contract have impliedly incorporated into it by submission to the
law of such foreign country, it occupies precisely the same position
as any other provision of the contract, and the Court which refuses
to enforce such foreign law, unless it involves the violation of
the public policy of the country,
clearly violates the duty imposed
upon it. Substantively, foreign law
is exactly what it has always been
regarded as a matter of procedure.
It is simply a fact. It stands upon
the same footing as the contract
itself. It must first be shown that
the parties intended to be bound
by a contract, and, when that is
done, the provisions of that contract must determine the rights of
the parties; and so, when it is
proved that the parties intended to
submit to a foreign law, that law
must determine their rights.
The grounds upon which a foreign municipal law is enforced and
that upon which a local municipal
law is enforced are identical. It
is the consent of the parties in both
instances which entitles the Court
to give force to the law. There is
this distinction, however: where no
questions of public policy are concerned, it is undoubtedly true that
the parties owing allegiance to the
same municipality may waive the
provisions of the local municipal
law and provide otherwise; but such

waiver must be clearly expressed,
or there will be conclusive presumption that by reason of their
allegiance to the government the
parties have consented to be bound
by the terms of the law. Where
there is diverse citizenship, no such
presumption can arise, and thequestion of the intention is an open
one.
Where there is no evidence of the
intention, the presumption generally is that the parties intend to
submit themselves to the law of the
place where the contract is made:
P. & 0. Co. v. Shand, 3 Moo. P.
C. (N. S.), 272 ; the Montana, 129
U. S., 397; Jacobs v. Credit Lyonnais, 12 0. B. D., 589. Lord MANSFIELD thus stated the law in Robinson v. Bland, 2 W. Black, 258
(176o): "The general rule established ex comitate et juregentium
is, that the place where the contract is made, and not where the
action is brought, is to be considered, in expounding and enforcing
the contract. But this rule admits
of an exception, where the parties
(at the time of the making of the
contract) had a view to a different
kingdom."
But in England, at least, the tendency is, in cases of affreightment,
toward a different presumption.
Mr. ScRUTTON, inhisworkon Charter Parties, etc., p. ii, after referring to the above rule, says : "It is
submitted that, in the absence of
any express indication of intention
as between the parties to a contract
of affreightment, there is a strong
presumption. in favor of the law of
the ship's flag."
That this presumption is not, in
England, conclusive is shown by
the case of the Chartered Mercantile Bank of India v. the Netherlands India Steam Nay. Co., io Q.

THE LAW OF THE FLAG.
B. D., 521, where an English merchant shipped goods at an English
port to be carried to a Dutch port,
in a ship registered in Holland and
carrying the Dutch flag, belonging
to a company registered in Holland and also in England as an
English stock company. The bill
of lading was in English. It was
held in the Queen's Bench and in
the Court of Appeals that these facts
were sufficient to overcome any presumption in favor of the law of the
flag, and showed that it was the intention of the parties to be governed
by the law of England. BRETT,
L.J., said: "It may be true, in one
sense, to say that where the ship
carries the flag of a particular country,prinidfade the contract made
by the captain of that ship is a contract made according to the laws of
the country whose flag the ship
carries. But that is not conclusive."
Accepting the intentions of the
parties,theu, as beingthe crucial test
of the law which applies in each particular case, it becomes evident that
the law of the flag of the ship is no
more than an element, to be considered in conjunction with all the
other facts of the transaction in
ascertaining the true intention of
the parties. As to its relative
weight in determining this question no inflexible rule can be established. In some instances its preponderance appears to be so great
as to amount almost to a conclusive
presumption. In other cases it may
be outweighed entirely by the other
facts.
This rule has been applied in two
classes of cases: first, those involving its effect upon the authority of
the master; and, second, those involving the validity of contracts of
affreightment.

The first may be subdivided into
those applying to the authority of
the ship-owner, either by way of
hypothecation or affreightment;
and, second, the authority of the
master over the cargo.
(i) Effect of the Law of the Flag
ufion the Authority of the A/aster.
(a) To bind ship-owner by way of
hypothecation or affreightnient.
The exception of bottomry bonds
from the general rule, that the lex
loc contraclusprevails, seemed anomalous to the writers on the conflict of laws.
MR. MACLACHLAN, in his treatise
on Merchant Shipping, published
in I86o, suggested that the explanation of this might be found in applying the law of the flag of the
ship. "The agency that we speak
of here is devolved upon him by
the law of his flag. The same law
that confers this authority ascertains its limits; and the flag at the
mast-head is notice to all the world
of the extent of such power to bind
the owners or freighters by his act"
(3 d ed., p. 170).
He further says: "Is the foreigner who deals in his own country with this agent bound by that
law (of the flagi)? First, he has notice of it, and therefore if he be,
there is no injustice.
"The notice of which we have
spoken is to be found in the national flag that he hoists on every
sea and sails under into every port.
Agents under the municipal laws,
even within the bounds of municipal jurisdiction, bear no such
public credentials. Moreover, his
command on board, the ship's papers, and all the circumstances that
connect him with the vessel, isolate
the vessel in the eyes of the world,
and demonstrate his relation to the
owners and freighters as their agent
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for a specific purpose, and with
power well defined under the national maritime law" (p. 170).
This rnl; was followed, in 1864,
in the leading case of Lloyd v. Guibert, i Q. B., II5. In that case
the plaintiff was a British subject,
who had chartered a vessel carrying
the French flag, at St. Thomas, a
Danish NVest India island, for a
voyage from St. Marc, in Hayti, to
Havre, London, or Liverpool, at
the charterer's option. The ship
was chartered by the master in
pursuance of his general author
ity. The vessel belonged to
French subjects, domiciled and
trading in France, and the charter party in the French language described her as French.
A cargo was shipped at St. Marc for
Liverpool, and the vessel sailed
with it; but she was compelled to
put into Fayal, a Portuguese port,
in distress, and, in order to repair,
the master borrowed money upon
bottomry upon ship, cargo andfreight. On arrival at Liverpool
the ship and cargo were insufficient
to pay the charge, and it fell to the
cargo-owner, who claimed to be indemnified by the ship-owners.
By the laws of France there was
no personal liability of the shipowners, and the case turned upon
what law was applicable. It was
held by the Queen's Bench, and
afterward upon appeal by the Exchequer Chamber, that neither the
Danish law (the law of the place of
contract) nor the law of Hayti
(where cargo was loaded), nor the
Portuguese law (where bottomry
was given), nor the law of England
(as the place of performance), were
intended by the parties to apply,
but that all the facts showed that
they intended to submit to the law
of the flag. In the Queen's Bench,
BLACKBURN, J., followed directly

the rule laid down by Mr. MACLAcHLIN, holding that the master
had no greater authority to bind the
ship-owner than was conferred by
the law of the ship. He said :
"We think that, as far as regards
the implied authority of the master
of a ship to bind his owners personally, the flag of the ship is notice
to all the world that the master's
authority is that conferred by the
law of the flag; that his mandate
is contained in the law of that
country, with which those who deal
with him must make themselves
acquainted at their peril" (33 L.

J. Q. B., 248).
Upon appeal, in the Exchequer
Chamber, the decision was placed
upon a broader ground. After
an elaborate discussion, it was
held that neither the English,
Portuguese or Haytien laws had any
application, and thatthe considerations in favor of the Danish law
were outweighed by those in favor
of the law of the flag of the ship.
The ground of the discussion in
the Court of the Queen's Bench,
that of the limitation of the authority of the master, was not considered in the Exchequer .Chamber,
the Court being of opinion that by
entering into the contract of affreightment the parties intended to
be governed by the law of the ship
as to all questions of sea damage.
Said XVILLIS, J. :
"The general rule, that where the
contract of affreightment does not
provide otherwise, there, as between the parties to such contract,
in respect of sea damage and its
incidents, the law of the ship should
govern, seems to be not only in accordance with the probable intention of the parties, but also most
consistent and intelligible, and
therefore most convenient to those
engaged in commerce."
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The same question had already
been before the courts of this country, and different decisions had been
rendered, none of them being exactly in accord with Lloyd v. Guibert.
In Pope v. Nickerson, 3 Story,
465, exactly the same question
arose. The schooner Anawan,
owned by citizens of Massachusetts,
took on board at Malaga a cargo
consigned to Philadelphia. She
put into Bermuda in distress, and
there the master executed bottomry
upon ship, cargo and freight. The
question arose whether there was
any personal liability of the shipowner. By the law of Pennsylvania, such personal liability existed, but by the laws of Massachusetts and Spain it did not exist.
Judge STORY held that the law of
Massachusetts, being the law of
the domicile of the owners, prevailed. He said:
"But what I wish to rely
on is the fact that the master has
no power to bind the owners beyond the authority given to him by
the owners; and that, from the
nature of the case, the extent of
that authority, is the law of the
country where the ship belongs and
they reside, for it is there that the
authority is given, and there it is to
be interpreted. If, by the law of
the domicile of the ship and of the
owners, the authority of the master
is limited to the ship and freight,
and does not, in the absence of express instructions, bind the owners
personally, it seems difficult to
understand how resort can be had
to the law of a foreign country, unknown and unsuspected (it may be)
by the owners, to expand that
authority to the positive creation
of personal obligations on the part
of the owners, and that, too, according to the law of every successive country which the ship may

visit in the course of a circuitous
voyage."
In Malpica v. McKeown, 1 La.,
249, a question arose as to the
liability of the ship-owner for property on board the ship belonging
to a passenger which was lost.
The point was made that, as the
passenger and property were taken
on board at a foreign port, the law
of that place, and not that of the
place of residence of the shipowner, should determine his liability. PORTER, J., said, in deciding that the lex loci contraclus
prevailed:
"We are of the opinion that the
law of the place of contract, and not
that of the owner's residence, must
be the rule by which his obligations
are to be ascertained. The lex loci
contractus governs all agreements
unless expressly excluded, or the
performance is to be in another
country, where different regulations prevail. What we do by another we do by ourselves; and we
are unable to distinguish between
the responsibility created by the
owner sending his agent to contract
in another country and that produced by going there and contracting hiinself."
The same question again arose in
that State, in Arayo v. Currel, i La.,
528, and a similar conclusion was
reached.
MARTIN, J., said: "If this question turned on the master's having
exceeded his powers, we are inclined to think that, as the general
rule authorized him to bind the
owner to the extent contracted for,
the plaintiff who contracted with
him was unaffected by a limitation
in a statute of another country, of
which he could not be presumed to
have any knowledge, and to the
authority of which he was not subject."
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(b) To control the cargo.This question is closely allied to the
last one, and the same rule applies:
"Whoever puts his goods on
board of a foreign ship to be carried, authorizes the master to deal
with them according to the laws of
the ship's flag, unless that authority
is limited by express stipulation between the parties at the time of the
agreement :" Scrutton on Charter
Parties and Bills of Lading, page i r.
In the Gaetano and MLIaria, L. R.
7 P. D., .37 (182), a charter party
was entered into in London for the
charter of an Italian ship. Goods
were shipped under this contract in
New York. The vessel put into
Fayal in distress, and while there
borrowed money upon bottomry of
ship, freight and cargo, without
communication with owners, as required by the law of England. In
a suit upon the bottoniry bond the
cargo-owners defended and alleged
that it was invalid, as it was made
It was
without communication.
held that the law of Italy, which
did not require communication,
was applicable.
BRETT, L. J., said: "What isthe
principle which is to govern this
case? The goods are put on board
an Italian ship, and the person to
exercise authority is an Italian
master. Is the authority of the
Italian master to depend upon the
law of the country of the shipper,
when that law is contrary to the
law of his own country? Why
should it? Is the master of a ship
to be taken to know the law of the
country of each shipper of the goods
which are put on board his ship?
It would be strange if that were so.
If a merchant puts his goods into
the power of an Italian master, on
board of an Italian owner's ship,
what is the meaning of the transac-

tion but that he is to deal with the
goods as an Italian master is to be
taken to deal with goods on board
his ship, unless lie is bound to another mode? Upon principle it
seems to me that he who ships goods
on board a foreign ship, ships them
to be dealt with by the master of
that ship according to the law of the
country of that ship, unless there
is a stipulation to the contrary."
8
In the Bahia, Br. & L. 3 , Dr.
LusHINGToN held, in a case where
cargo was shippedon board a French
ship, that all questions relating to
transshipment were to be determined by the law of the ship.
Although the question has not
yet been determined by our courts,
it seems most probable that the law
of the flag would be followed to its
proper limit, that is, to questions
concerning the right of the master
to bind the ship-owner, either by
hypothecation or by implied stipulations in contracts of affreightment
limiting the liability of the shipowner, and also to all questions in
reference to the power of master
over cargo.
It seems, too, that questions of
the right of the ship-owner to recover pro rata freight are to be
governed by the law of the flag:
Lowndes, on General Average, p.
229. The question was raised in
Nat. Board of Underwriters v. 'Melchers, 45 Fed. Rep.. 543, but its
decision was unnecessary under the
facts of that case.
It will be observed that in the
case of Pope v. Chickerson, Judge
STORY approached very closely to
the doctrine of the "law of the
flag."
But to have applied that
law to that case would have left the
The flag was
case undecided.
American, but by rererring to that
country, owing to our peculiar sys-
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tern of government, there was no
uniformity in the law upon this
subject, and therefore some further
test was necessary.
(2) The Efrect of the Law of the
Flag upfon the Validity of the Contract of Affreightment.-In the
Missouri Steamship Company, 42
Ch. Div., 321 (1886), this rule was
widely extended. In that case a
contract was made in Boston, between an American citizen and the
agent in Boston of a British steamship company, for the transportation of certain cattle in the 1issouri, a British ship. The contract
contained a provision that the company should not be liable for negligence of the master or crew. Such
a provision was valid by the English law, but invalid by that of the
United States and Massachusetts.
The cattle were lost by the negligence of the master and crew.
Crnlnv, J., held that the English
law, as the law of the ship, showed
that it was the intention of the
parties to submit to the English
law. He said: "I have referred
somewhat fully to this judgment
(Lloyd v. Guibert) in order to show
that the principle upon which it
proceeds is not confined to the particular facts of that case, but is applicable, and ought to be applied,
not merely to questions of construction arising out of the contract of
affreightment, but to questions as
to the validity of stipulations in the
contract itself. Any distinctions
founded on the difference of these
questions were not rested on substantial grounds, and would lead to
uncertainty and confusion in mercantile transactions of this character. It is just to presume that in
reference to all such questions the
parties have submitted themselves
to the law of one country only,

namely, that of the flag; and so to
hold is to adopt a simple, a natural
and consistent rule."
Upon appeal, however, while
the decision was affirmed, the
Court, evidently, did not go quite
so far. Lord HALSBURY, L. C.,
said: "Now this is a contract
for the conveyance of cattle from
Boston to England by sea, on
board a British ship, by a British
company whose domicile is in England. These circumstances, though
very strong, would, perhaps, not be
conclusive. But when I look at the
contract itself and find that the ordinary exceptions to the bill of lading are the Queen's enemies and
so on, it is absolutely impossible
to resist the conclusion that the
parties did contemplate being governed by the English law in their
contracting relations." The effect
of the use of the words, "Queen's
enemies," is shown in the principal
case to mean only the enemies of
the ruling power, which mighthave
been that of America or of England. The learned judge was also
of the opinion that, as one of the
provisions only, and not the entire
contract, was void by the law of
Massachusotts, where it was made,
that it would be enforced by the
English courts.
In the United States directly
opposite conclusions have been
reached.
In the Brantford City, 29 Fed.,
373, decided in D. C. U. S., S. D. of
N. Y., in 1886, the facts were almost identical with those in the
Missouri. Judge - BRow-N- held
that the law of the United States
should prevail. It may be doubtful
whether the point was actually involved in that case, as the facts tend
to show that the proximate cause
of the damage was the defective
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fittings of the steamship, amtiounting to unseaworthiness, which
was not one of the exceptions
of the bill of lading: Steel v.
State Line S. S. Co., 3 App. Cases,
72; the Huaji, 16 Fed. Rep., 861;
Tattersall v. Steamship Co., L. R.,
12 Q. B. D., 297. Referring to the
law of the flag, he says: "The
'law of the flag,' so called, which,
it is urged, should govern this case,
does not embody any rule of legal
construction. Literally, it is but a
concise phrase to express a simple
fact, namely, the law of the country to which the ship belongs and
whose flag she bears, whether it
accords with the general maritime
law or not. In so far, however, as
the law of the flag does not represent the general maritime law, it is
but the municipal law of the ship's
home."
In the Titania, 19 Fed. Rep., iot
(1883), the same judge held that in
the case of a shipment from Dundee to New York, on board a British
vessel, the English law should govern in respect to damages upon the
high seas. He said: "The shipment being made in England, and
upon an English vessel, the law of
the flag should govern." In the
Oranmore, 24 Fed., 922, there was
an express provision that any question under the bill of lading should
be determined by the English law.
In the District Court of U. S., D. of
Maryland, Judge MORRIs held that
the English law should goverti.
Considering that case in connection
with the decisions of the courts of
this country, 'it is questionable
whether there was not merely an
attempt to evade the decisions in
reference to liability for negligence. But the question was not
raised.
This question came before the

Supreme Court of the United
States in the Liverpool and Great
Western Steam Co. v. Phoenix Insurance Co., 129 U. S., 397 (1889)
(the Montana). There, a contract
was entered into in New York by a
resident of New York with the
agent of a British company for
carriage of certain property to
Liverpool. The bill of lading contained the usual clause, exempting
the company from negligence of
master and crew. The property
was shipped on the Montana, carrying the English flag, which was
lost through the negligence of the
master and crew.
The Court held that the law of
this country, as the lex loci contractus, must prevail, and .that the
exemption clause was invalid.
Mr. Justice GRAY said: "This
review of the principal cases demonstrates that, according to the
great preponderance, if not the uniform concurrence, of authority, the
general rule, that the nature, the
obligation and the interpretation of
a contract are to be governed by
the law of the place where it is
made, unless the parties at the time
of making it have some other law
in view, requires a contract of
affreightment, made in one country between citizens or residents
thereof, and the performance of
which begins there, to be governed
by the law of that country, unless
the parties, when entering into the
contract, clearly manifest a mutual
intention that it shall be governed
by the law of some other country."
An examination of these cases
demonstrates that the American
courts will not, from the mere fact
that goods were shipped on an
English vessel, assume that the
contract is an English one.
The question is not free from
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doubt, and it is probable that pa- general rule is that the law of the
country where a contract is made
triotic motives had some effect
governs as to the nature, the obliin both cases.
gation and interpretation. *The
In some respects the American
rule, to prefer the lex loci contrac- parties to a contract are either the
tus, seems to have more to support subjects to the power there ruling
or, as temporary residents, owe it
it. Take the following case:
a temporary allegience; in either
If goods should be shipped at an
English port in an American ship,
case, equally they must be underunder a contract made with ship's
stood to submit to the law there
agent at that place, and incorpo- prevailing, and to agree to its action
rated into the bill of lading was the upon the contract."
In the recent case of Jacobs v.
clause that the owner should not
be liable for negligence of master
Credit Lyonnais, L. R. 12 Q. B. D.,
and crew, it does not seem proba- 589, the defendants, a London firm,
contracted in London to sell to the
ble that the English courts would
hold that the shipment of the goods
plaintiffs, London merchants, a
quantity of Algerian exports, to be
on the American vessel'would make
shipped by a French company at
the contract an American one.
an Algerian port, on board vessels
They would probably discover some
facts to show that it was the inten- to be provided by the plaintiffs in
tion of the parties to submit to the
London. The contract also contained provisions in regard to shipEnglish law.
Upon principle, the case of the ment by steamer from Algiers, and
Missouri appears to be in conflict the plaintiffs were required to approve and accept the exports as
with other English cases.
put on board in that country.
-In P. & 0. v. Shand, 3 Moo. P.
In the Court of Appeals, BOWEN,
C. (N. S.), 272 ; 12 L. T. N. S., 8o8
(I865), the plaintiff paid one entire
L. J., remarks : "Certain presumptions or rules in this respect have
sum for his passage from England
to Mauritius by a ship of the de- been laid down by judicial writers
of different countries and accepted
fendant company, and signed a
by the courts, based upon common
ticket stating that he accepted the
sense, upon business convenience,
conditions printed thereon, one of
and upon the comity of nations;
which was that the company would
not be responsible for loss of the
but they are only presumptions or
luggage of the passengers. Some .prima-facierules that are capable
of being displaced whereyer the
of the plaintiff's luggage was last
seen at Suez, in the company's pos- clear intention of the parties can be
gatbered from the document itself
session, and was not afterward to
and from the nature of the transacbe found. In an action to iecover
its value, the Supreme Court of tion. The broad rule is that the law
of the counitry where the contract
Mauritius held that the Fret'ch law,
which there prevailed, should gov- is made presumably governs the
nature, the obligation and the interern. Upon appeal, the Privy Council reversed that Court's holding pretation of it, unless the contrary
appears to be the express intention
that the liability of the company
of the parties.
was to be determined by the law
"Again, it may be that the conof England, as the lex loci contract is partly to be performed in
traclus. TURNER, L.J., said: "The
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one place and partly in another.
In such a case, the only certain
guide is to be found in applying
sound ideas of'business. convenience and sense to the language of
the contract itself, with a view to
discovering from it the true intention of the parties.
"Even in respect of any performance that is to take place abroad,
the parties may still have desired
that their liabilities and obligations
shall be governed by the English
law, or it may be that they have
intended to incorporate the foreign
law to regulate the method and
manner of performance abroad,
without altering any of the incidents which attach to the contract
according to the English law.
Stereotyped rules laid down by
juridical writers cannot, therefore,
be accepted as infallible canons of
interpretation in these days, when
commercial transactions have altered in character and increased in
complexity; and there can be no
hard-and-fast rule by which to construe the multiform commercial
agreements with which, in modern
times, we have to deal."
The rule suggested by Mr. Carver
(Carriers, page 218), that where
there is a division of carriage the
parties may intend to be bound by
one law as to one part and another
law as to another part, does not
seem to solve this question.
He puts the following case: "An
agreement is made between Americans for the carriage of cotton,
under a through bill of lading,
from a place inland in the United
States to England, say by rail to
Philadelphia, and thence by steamer
belonging to an English line. It
may well be supposed that the law
of the flag was meant to govern the
contract as to the latter part of the
transit, although as to the first part

there would be little doubt that the
American law would determine its
effect."
Change the facts of this case
slightly, and supply, instead of an
English line of steamships, a line
composed of American and English
ships. How can there be any presumption of the intention that the
law of the flag was intended to
govern in such a case?
The shipper at the inland point
does not know whether his cotton
will be carried on an English or an
American sbip.
It certainly is not true that a
-stipulation in a bill of lading, that
the ship-owner shall not be liable for
the negligence of the master and
crew, is to be void or valid by the
fact that the cotton is shipped on
the American or English ship, a
fact of which the shipper has no
knowledge whatever.
The lex locicontractus has better
support. In a contract for carriage
the agreement is made at one place
for delivery in another. It is evident that the customs of the place
of delivery must govern the manner
of delivery. That would seem to
be the only application of the law
of that place. Generally, the manner of carriage is an immaterial
question and does not affect the
contract.
Two facts only are of importancethe delivery of the goods to the
carrier, and the delivery by the
carrier to the consignee.
The
method of carriage is, generally
speaking, immaterial. If there is
right delivery the law is satisfied.
Why, then, should an immaterial
fact determrine the relations of the
parties to the contract and decide
whether a provision of the contract
is valid or invalid?
HORACE L. C1EYNEy. .
Philadelphia.

